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Hofelich Mohr26, F. Högden5, K. Hui27, M. Johannesson10, J. Kalodimos28, E. Kaszubowski29, D. 
M. Kennedy30, R. Lei15, T. A. Lindsay26, S. Liverani31, C. R. Madan32, D. Molden33, E. 
Molleman16, R. D. Morey34, L. B. Mulder16, B. R. Nijstad16, N. G. Pope35, B. Pope36, J. M. 
Prenoveau37, F. Rink16, E. Robusto4, H. Roderique38, A. Sandberg24, E. Schlu ̈ter39, F. D. 
Schönbrodt25, M. F. Sherman37, S. A. Sommer40, K. Sotak41, S. Spain42, C. Spörlein43, T. 
Stafford44, L. Stefanutti4, S. Tauber16, J. Ullrich21, M. Vianello4, E.-J. Wagenmakers45, M. 
Witkowiak46, S. Yoon19, and B. A. Nosek3,47 
Abstract 
Twenty-nine teams involving 61 analysts used the same data set to address the same research 
question: whether soccer referees are more likely to give red cards to dark-skin-toned players 
than to light-skin-toned players. Analytic approaches varied widely across the teams, and the 
estimated effect sizes ranged from 0.89 to 2.93 (Mdn = 1.31) in odds-ratio units. Twenty teams 
(69%) found a statistically significant positive effect, and 9 teams (31%) did not observe a 
significant relationship. Overall, the 29 different analyses used 21 unique combinations of 
  
covariates. Neither analysts’ prior beliefs about the effect of interest nor their level of expertise 
readily explained the variation in the outcomes of the analyses. Peer ratings of the quality of the 
analyses also did not account for the variability. These findings suggest that significant variation 
in the results of analyses of complex data may be difficult to avoid, even by experts with honest 
intentions. Crowdsourcing data analysis, a strategy in which numerous research teams are 
recruited to simultaneously investigate the same research question, makes transparent how 
defensible, yet subjective, analytic choices influence research results. 
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In the scientific process, creativity is mostly associated with the generation of testable 
hypotheses and the development of suitable research designs. Data analysis, on the other hand, is 
sometimes seen as the mechanical, unimaginative process of revealing results from a research 
study. Despite methodologists’ remonstrations (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Gelman & 
Loken, 2014; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), it is easy to overlook the fact that results 
may depend on the chosen analytic strategy, which itself is imbued with theory, assumptions, 
and choice points. In many cases, there are many reasonable (and many unreasonable) 
approaches to evaluating data that bear on a research question (Carp, 2012a, 2012b; Gelman & 
Loken, 2014; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012). 
Researchers may understand this conceptually, but there is little appreciation for the implications 
in practice. In some cases, authors use a particular analytic strategy because it is the one they 
know how to use, rather than because they have a specific rationale for using it. Peer reviewers 
may comment on and suggest improvements to a chosen analytic strategy, but rarely do those 
  
comments emerge from working with the actual data set (Sakaluk, Williams, & Biernat, 2014). 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for peer reviewers to take the authors’ analytic strategy for 
granted and comment exclusively on other aspects of the manuscript. More important, once an 
article is published, reanalyses and critiques of the chosen analytic strategy are slow to emerge 
and rare (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Krumholz & Peterson, 2014; McCullough, McGeary, & Harrison, 
2006), in part because of the low frequency with which data are available for reanalysis 
(Wicherts, Borsboom, Kats, & Molenaar, 2006). The reported results and implications drive the 
impact of published articles; the analytic strategy is pushed to the background. 
But what if the methodologists are correct? What if scientific results are highly contingent on 
subjective decisions at the analysis stage? In that case, the process of certifying a particular result 
on the basis of an idiosyncratic analytic strategy might be fraught with unrecognized uncertainty 
(Gelman & Loken, 2014), and research findings might be less trustworthy than they at first 
appear to be (Cumming, 2014). Had the authors made different assumptions, an entirely different 
result might have been observed (Babtie, Kirk, & Stumpf, 2014). In this article, we report an 
investigation that addressed the current lack of knowledge about how much diversity in analytic 
choice there can be when different researchers analyze the same data and whether such diversity 
results in different conclusions. Specifically, we report the impact of analytic decisions on 
research results obtained by 29 teams that analyzed the same data set to answer the same 
research question. The results of this project illustrate how researchers can vary in their analytic 
approaches and how results can vary according to these analytic choices. 
Crowdsourcing Data Analysis: Skin Tone and Red Cards in Soccer 
The primary research question tested in this crowdsourced project was whether soccer players 
with dark skin tone are more likely than those with light skin tone to receive red cards from 
  
referees.1 The decision to give a player a red card results in the player’s ejection from the game 
and has severe consequences because it obliges his team to continue with one fewer player for 
the remainder of the match. Red cards are given for aggressive behavior, such as a tackling 
violently, fouling with the intent to deny an opponent a clear goal-scoring opportunity, hitting or 
spitting on an opposing player, or using threatening and abusive language. However, despite a 
standard set of rules and guidelines for both players and match officials, referees’ decision 
making is often fraught with ambiguity (e.g., it may not be obvious whether a player committed 
an intentional foul or was simply going for the ball). It is inherently a judgment call on the part 
of the referee as to whether a player’s behavior merits a red card. 
One might anticipate that players with darker skin tone would receive more red cards because of 
expectancy effects in social perception: Ambiguous behavior tends to be interpreted in line with 
prior attitudes and beliefs (Bodenhausen, 1988; Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Frank 
& Gilovich, 1988; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). In societies as diverse as India, China, the 
Dominican Republic, Brazil, Jamaica, the Philippines, the United States, Chile, Kenya, and 
Senegal, light skin is seen as a sign of beauty, status, and social worth (Maddox & Chase, 2004; 
Maddox & Gray, 2002; Sidanius, Pena, & Sawyer, 2001; Twine, 1998). Negative attitudes 
toward persons with dark skin may lead a referee to interpret an ambiguous foul by such a person 
as a severe foul and, consequently, to give a red card (Kim & King, 2014; Parsons, Sulaeman, 
Yates, & Hamermesh, 2011; Price & Wolfers, 2010). 
Consider for a moment how you would test this research hypothesis using a complex archival 
data set including referees’ decisions across numerous leagues, games, years, referees, and 
players and a variety of potentially relevant control variables that you might or might not include 
in your analysis. Would you treat each red-card decision as an independent observation? How 
  
would you address the possibility that some referees give more red cards than others? Would you 
try to control for the seniority of the referee? Would you take into account whether a referee’s 
familiarity with a player affects the referee’s likelihood of assigning a red card? Would you look 
at whether players in some leagues are more likely to receive red cards compared with players in 
other leagues, and whether the proportion of players with dark skin varies across leagues and 
player positions? As these questions suggest, many analytic decisions are required. Moreover, 
for a given question, different decisions might be defensible and simultaneously have 
implications for the findings observed and the conclusions drawn. You and another researcher 
might make different judgment calls (regarding statistical method, covariates included, or 
exclusion rules) that, prima facie, are equally valid. This crowdsourced project examined the 
extent to which such good faith, subjective choices by different researchers analyzing a complex 
data set shape the reported results. 
Disclosures 
Data, materials, and online resources 
Further information on this study is available online as a project on the Open Science Framework 
(OSF). Table 1 provides an overview of the materials from each project stage that are available 
at OSF. The project’s main folder at OSF (https://osf.io/gvm2z) provides links to all files, which 
include the data set (https://osf.io/fv8c3/) and a description of the included variables 
(https://osf.io/9yh4x/), a numeric overview of results by the various teams at the various project 
stages (https://osf.io/c9mkx/), graphical overviews of results at the various stages 
(https://osf.io/j2zth/), and the scripts to obtain each plot (https://osf.io/rgqtx/). The main folder 
also includes the manuscript for this article and a subarticle by each team detailing its analysis 
(https://osf.io/qix4g/). 
  
[TS: Please insert Table 1 about here.] 
The Supplemental Material available online 
(http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/2515245917747646) includes a project 
description, notes on the research process, and complete text of the surveys sent to the analysis 
teams. Further, the Supplemental Material documents the analytic approach taken by each team 
and indicates how these approaches were altered on the basis of peer feedback. In addition, the 
Supplemental Material includes an overview of results for the primary research question as well 
as additional analyses (including results for a second research question that initially was part of 
this project but was not pursued further because the raw data were inadequate). The 
Supplemental Material also discusses the limitations of the data set and of including player’s 
club and league country as covariates and provides a link to an IPython notebook illustrating one 
team’s analysis. Finally, the Supplemental Material includes the text of the survey of the 
analysts’ familiarity with the different statistical techniques used and the survey of their 
assessment of other teams’ analytic choices, as well as results of an exploratory analysis 
undertaken to determine whether convergence regarding the results obtained depended on the 
analytic approach taken. 
Ethical approval 
This research was conducted using publicly available archival data and according to ethical 
standards. 
Stages of the Crowdsourcing Process 
The project unfolded over several key stages. First, the unique data set used for this project was 
obtained, documented, and prepared for dissemination to participating analysts (Stage 1). Then, 
analysts were recruited to participate in the project (Stage 2). The first round of data analysis 
  
(Stage 3) was followed by round-robin peer evaluations of each analysis (Stage 4). The second 
round of data analysis (Stage 5) was followed by an initial discussion of results and debate, 
which led to further analyses (Stage 6a). When we tried to decide on a common conclusion while 
writing, editing, and reviewing the manuscript (Stage 6b), further questions emerged, and an 
internal peer review was started. In this review, each team’s approach was evaluated by other 
analysts who were experts in that technique (Stage 7). The project then concluded with revision 
of this manuscript. During several of these stages, the analysts’ subjective beliefs about the 
hypothesis being tested were assessed using questionnaires. The timeline of the project is 
summarized in Figure 1. 
[TS: Please insert Figure 1 about here.] 
Fig. 1. 
Overview of the project’s stages. 
Stage 1: Building the data set 
From a company for sports statistics, we obtained demographic information on all soccer players 
(N = 2,053) who played in the first male divisions of England, Germany, France, and Spain in 
the 2012–2013 season. In addition, we obtained data about the interactions of those players with 
all referees (N = 3,147) whom they encountered across their professional careers. Thus, the 
interaction data for most players covered multiple seasons of play, from their first professional 
match until the time that the data were acquired, in June 2014. For players who were new in the 
2012–2013 season, the data covered a single season. The data included the number of matches in 
which each player encountered each referee and our dependent variable, the number of red cards 
given to each player by each referee. The data set was made available as a list with 146,028 
dyads of players and referees. 
  
Photos for 1,586 of the 2,053 players were available from our source. Players for whom no photo 
was available tended to be relatively new players or those who had just moved up from a team in 
a lower league. The variable player’s skin tone was coded by two independent raters blind to the 
research question. On the basis of the photos, the raters categorized the players on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very light skin) to 3 (neither dark nor light skin) to 5 (very dark skin), and these 
ratings correlated highly (r = .92, r = .86). This variable was rescaled to be bounded by 0 (very 
light skin) and 1 (very dark skin) prior to the final analysis, to ensure consistency of effect sizes 
across the teams of analysts. The raw ratings were rescaled to 0, .25, .50, .75, and 1 to create this 
new scale. 
A variety of potential independent variables were included in the data set (for the complete 
codebook, see https://osf.io/9yh4x). The data included players’ typical position, weight, and 
height and referees’ country of origin. For each dyad, the data included the number of games in 
which the referee and player encountered each other and the number of yellow and red cards 
awarded to the player. The records indicated players’ ages, clubs, and leagues—which frequently 
change throughout players’ careers—at the time of data collection, not at the specific times the 
red cards were received (see Table 2 for a summary of some of the player variables). Given the 
sensitivity of the research topic, referees’ identities were protected by anonymization; each 
referee and each country of referees’ origin was assigned a numerical identifier. Our archival 
data set provided the opportunity to estimate the magnitude of the relationship between player’s 
skin tone and number of red cards received, but did not offer the opportunity to identify causal 
relations between these variables. 
[TS: Please insert Table 2 about here.] 
Stage 2: recruitment and initial survey of data analysts 
  
The first three authors and last author posted a description of the project online (see Supplement 
1 in the Supplemental Material available online). This document included an overview of the 
crowdsourcing project, a description of the data set and the planned timeline. The project was 
advertised via Brian Nosek’s Twitter account, blogs of prominent academics, and word of 
mouth. 
Seventy-seven researchers expressed initial interest in participating and were given access to the 
OSF project page to obtain the data. Individual analysts were welcome to form teams, and most 
did. For the sake of consistency, in this article we use the term team also for those few 
individuals who chose to work on their own. Thirty-three teams submitted a report in the first 
round (Stage 3), and 29 teams submitted a final report. The analysis presented in this article 
focuses on the submissions of those 29 teams. In total, the final project involved 61 data analysts 
plus the four authors who organized the project. A demographic survey revealed that the team 
leaders worked in 13 different countries and came from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, 
including psychology, statistics, research methods, economics, sociology, linguistics, and 
management. At the time that the first draft of this manuscript was written, 38 of the 61 data 
analysts (62%) held a Ph.D. (62%), and 17 (28%) had a master’s degree. The analysts came from 
various ranks and included 8 full professors (13%), 9 associate professors (15%), 13 assistant 
professors (21%), 8 postdocs (13%), and 17 doctoral students (28%). In addition, 27 participants 
(44%) had taught at least one undergraduate statistics course, 22 (36%) had taught at least one 
graduate statistics course, and 24 (39%) had published at least one methodological or statistical 
article. 
In addition to collecting data on the analysts’ demographic characteristics, we asked the team 
leaders for their opinion regarding the research question. For example, using a 5-point Likert 
  
scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely), they answered the question “How likely do you 
think it is that soccer referees tend to give more red cards to dark-skinned players?” This 
question was asked again at several points in the research project to track beliefs over time: when 
analysts submitted their analytic approach, when they submitted their final analyses, and after the 
group discussion of all the teams’ results. 
Stage 3: first round of data analysis 
After registering and answering the subjective-beliefs survey for the first time, the research 
teams were given access to the data. Each team then decided on its own analytic approach to test 
the primary research question and analyzed the data independently of the other teams (see Item 1 
in Supplement 2 for further details). Then, via a standardized Qualtrics survey, the teams 
submitted to the coordinators structured summaries of their analytic approach, including 
information about data transformations, exclusions, covariates, the statistical techniques used, the 
software used, and the results (see Supplement 3 for the text of the survey materials sent to the 
team leaders; the Qualtrics files and descriptions of the individual teams’ analytic approaches are 
available at https://osf.io/yug9r/ and https://osf.io/3ifm2/, respectively). The teams were also 
asked about their beliefs regarding the primary research question.  
Stage 4: round-robin peer evaluations of overall analysis quality 
For the first three stages of the project, the teams were expected to work independently of each 
other. However, beginning with Stage 4, they were encouraged to discuss and debate their 
respective approaches to the data set. In Stage 4, after descriptions of the results were removed, 
the structured summaries were collated into a single questionnaire and distributed to all the teams 
for peer review. The analytic approaches were presented in a random order, and the analysts 
were instructed to provide feedback on at least the first three approaches that they examined. 
  
They were asked to provide qualitative feedback as well as a confidence rating (“How confident 
are you that the described approach below is suitable for analyzing the research questions?”) on a 
7-point scale from 1 (unconfident) to 7 (confident). On average, each team received feedback 
from about five other teams (M = 5.32, SD = 2.87). 
The qualitative and quantitative feedback was aggregated into a single report and shared with all 
team members. Thus, each team received peer-review commentaries about their own analytic 
strategy and the other teams’ analytic strategies. Notably, these commentaries came from 
reviewers who were highly familiar with the data set, yet at this point the teams were unaware of 
others’ results (for the complete survey and round-robin feedback, see https://osf.io/evfts/ and 
https://osf.io/ic634/, respectively). Each team therefore had the opportunity to learn from others’ 
analytic approaches and from the qualitative and quantitative feedback provided by peer 
reviewers, but did not have access to other teams’ estimated effect sizes. This phase offered the 
teams an opportunity to improve the quality of their analyses and, if anything, ought to have 
promoted convergence in analytic strategies and outcomes. 
Stage 5: second round of data analysis 
Following the peer review, the teams had the opportunity to change their analytic strategies and 
draw new conclusions (see Supplement 4 for a list of the initial and final approaches of each 
team). They submitted formal reports in a standardized format and also filled out a standardized 
questionnaire similar to that used in Stage 2. Their subjective beliefs about the primary research 
question were also assessed in this questionnaire. Notably, the teams were not forced to present a 
single effect size without robustness checks. Rather, they were encouraged to present results in 
the way they would in a published article, with formal Method and Results sections. Some teams 
adopted a model-building approach and reported the results of the model that they felt was the 
  
most appropriate one. The fact that not every team did this represents yet another subjective, yet 
defensible analytic choice. All the teams’ reports are available on the OSF, at 
https://osf.io/qix4g. Supplement 5 presents a brief summary of each team’s methods and a one-
sentence description of each team’s findings, and Supplement 11 provides an illustration of one 
team’s process. 
Stage 6: open discussion and debate, further analyses, and drafting a report on the project 
After the formal analysis, the reports were compiled and uploaded to the OSF project. A 
summary e-mail sent to all the teams invited them to review the reports and discuss as a group 
the analytic strategies and what to conclude regarding the primary research question. Team 
members engaged in a substantive e-mail discussion regarding the variation in findings and 
analytic strategies (the full text of this discussion can be found at https://osf.io/8eg94/). For 
example, one team found a strong influence of five outliers on their results. Other teams 
performed additional analyses to investigate whether their results were similarly driven by a few 
outliers (interestingly, they were not). Limitations of the data set were also discussed (see 
Supplement 9). At this stage, a final assessment of subjective beliefs was conducted; this survey 
also presented a series of possible statements summarizing the outcome of this project and asked 
the analysts to rate their agreement with each one. The first three authors and last author then 
wrote a first draft of this manuscript, and all the team members were invited to jointly edit and 
extend the draft using Google Docs. 
When the analysts scrutinized each others’ results, it became apparent that differences in results 
may have been due not only to variations in statistical models, but also to variations in the choice 
of covariates. Doing a preliminary reanalysis, the leader of Team 10 discovered that including 
league and club as covariates may have been responsible for the nonsignificant results obtained 
  
by some teams. A debate emerged regarding whether the inclusion of these covariates was 
quantitatively defensible given that the data on league and club were available for the time of 
data collection only and these variables likely changed over the course of many players’ careers 
(see the discussion at https://osf.io/2prib/). The project coordinators therefore asked the 10 teams 
that had included these variables in their final models to rerun their models without these 
covariates (see Supplement 10). Additionally, these teams were allowed to decide whether they 
wanted to revise their final models to exclude these covariates.2 The results reported in this 
article reflect the teams’ choices of their final models. 
Stage 7: more granular peer assessments of analysis quality 
The discussion and debate about analytic choices motivated the project coordinators to initiate a 
more fine-grained assessment of each of the final analyses to identify potential flaws that might 
account for any variability in the reported results. Therefore, after the methods and results of all 
the teams were known, the analysts participated in an additional internal peer-review assessment. 
First, they indicated their familiarity with each approach used by each team, on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very unfamiliar) to 5 (very familiar; see Supplement 12). For some techniques, 
most of the analysts responded “familiar” or “very familiar” (e.g., 34 in the case of multiple 
regression). For other techniques, relatively few analysts did so (e.g., 3 in the case of Bayesian 
clustering with the Dirichlet process). On the basis of their expertise, the coordinators then 
assigned each analyst one to three analytic strategies to assess in greater depth (i.e., strategies 
involving techniques that the analyst reported being familiar or very familiar with). No 
researcher was assigned to review the approach of his or her own team.  
From comments the analysts made in the earlier rounds of analysis (Stages 3–6), the coordinators 
derived a list of seven potential statistical concerns regarding analytic decisions that were made 
  
(see Supplement 13). For example, an analysis may have unnecessarily excluded a large number 
of cases or may not have adequately accounted for the number of games played. The analysts 
were asked to report whether the assigned analytic strategies had failed to take into account each 
of these seven issues (on a 5-point scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree). 
Note that lower scores indicated that more obstacles were avoided, and higher scores indicated 
that more issues were left unaddressed. For each assigned strategy, the survey also included an 
open-ended question asking whether there was an additional analytic issue that might have 
biased the results, and another item asked the analysts to rate their agreement that this additional 
issue affected the validity of the approach (same 5-point scale). The final question asked the 
analysts to rate how convinced they were that the approach in question successfully addressed 
most of the potential statistical concerns (1= very unconvinced, 5 = very convinced). 
Main Findings From the Project 
How much did results vary between different teams using the same data to test the same 
hypothesis? 
Table 3 shows each team’s final analytic technique, model specifications for treatment of 
nonindependence, and reported effect size.3 The analytic techniques chosen ranged from simple 
linear regression to complex multilevel regression and Bayesian approaches. The teams also 
varied greatly in their decisions regarding which covariates to include (see https://osf.io/sea6k/ 
for the rationales the teams provided). Table 4 shows that the 29 teams used 21 unique 
combinations of covariates. Apart from the variable games (i.e., the number of games played 
under a given referee, which was used by all the teams, just one covariate (player position, 69%) 
was used in more than half of the teams’ analyses, and three were used in just one analysis. 
Three teams chose to use no covariates, and another 3 teams included player position as the only 
  
covariate in their analysis. Four sets of variables were used by 2 teams each, and each of the 
remaining 15 teams used a unique combination of covariates.   
[TS: Please insert Tables 3 and 4 about here.] 
What were the consequences of this variability in analytic approaches?  
Figure 2 shows each team’s estimated effect size, along with its 95% confidence interval (CI). 
As this figure and Table 3 show, the estimated effect sizes ranged from 0.89 (slightly negative) 
to 2.93 (moderately positive) in odds-ratio (OR) units; the median estimate was 1.31. The 
confidence intervals for many of the estimates overlap, which is expected because they are based 
on the same data. Twenty teams (69%) found a significant positive relationship, p < .05, and nine 
teams (31%) found a nonsignificant relationship. No team reported a significant negative 
relationship. 
[TS: Please insert Figure 2 about here.] 
Fig. 2. 
Point estimates (in order of magnitude) and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of soccer 
players’ skin tone on the number of red cards awarded by referees. Reported results, along with 
the analytic approach taken, are shown for each of the 29 analytic teams. The teams are ordered 
so that the smallest reported effect size is at the top and the largest is at the bottom. The asterisks 
indicate upper bounds that have been truncated to increase the interpretability of the plot; the 
actual upper bounds of the confidence intervals were 11.47 for Team 21 and 78.66 for Team 27. 
OLS = ordinary least squares; WLS = weighted least squares. 
What were the results obtained with the different types of analytic approaches used? 
Teams that employed logistic or Poisson models tended to report estimates that were larger than 
those of teams that used linear models (see the effect sizes in Fig. 3, in which the teams are 
  
clustered according to the distribution used for analyses). Fifteen teams used logistic models, and 
11 of these teams found a significant effect (median OR = 1.34; median absolution deviation, or 
MAD = 0.07). Six teams used Poisson models, and 4 of these teams found a significant effect 
(median OR = 1.36, MAD = 0.08). Of the 6 teams that used linear models, 3 found a significant 
effect (median OR = 1.21, MAD = 0.05). The final 2 teams used models classified as 
miscellaneous, and both of these teams reported significant effects (ORs = 1.71 and 2.88, 
respectively).  
[TS: Please insert Figure 3 about here.] 
Fig. 3. 
Point estimates (clustered by analytic approach) and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of 
soccer players’ skin tone on the number of red cards awarded by referees. Reported results, along 
with the analytic approach taken, are shown for each of the 29 analytic teams. The teams are 
clustered according to the distribution used in their analyses; within each cluster, the teams are 
listed in order of the magnitude of the reported effect size, from smallest at the top to largest at 
the bottom. The asterisks indicate upper bounds that have been truncated to increase the 
interpretability of the plot (see Fig. 2). 
The teams also varied in their approaches to handling the nonindependence of players and 
referees, and this variability also influenced both median estimates of the effect size and the rates 
of significant results. In total, 15 teams estimated a fixed effect or variance component for 
players, referees, or both; 12 of these teams reported significant effects (median OR = 1.32, 
MAD = 0.12). Eight teams used clustered standard errors, and 4 of these teams found significant 
effects (median OR = 1.28, MAD = 0.13). An additional 5 teams did not account for this artifact, 
and 4 of these teams reported significant effects (median OR = 1.39, MAD = 0.28). The 
  
remaining team used fixed effects for the referee variable and reported a nonsignificant result 
(OR = 0.89). 
Did the analysts’ beliefs regarding the hypothesis change over time? 
Analysts’ subjective beliefs about the research hypothesis were assessed four times during the 
project: at initial registration (i.e., before they had received the data), after they had accessed the 
data and submitted their analytic approach, at the time final analyses were submitted, and after a 
group discussion of all the teams’ approaches and results. Responses were centered at 0 for 
analyses to increase interpretability (thus, the range was from –2, for very unlikely, to +2, for 
very likely). Subjective beliefs changed over time (see Fig. 4). At initial registration, there was 
slight agreement, on average, that the number of red cards was positively related to players’ skin 
tone, yet opinions varied greatly (M = 0.46, SD = 0.84). At the next assessment, the slight initial 
agreement had turned into slight disagreement (M = -0.61, SD = 0.88). When the teams 
submitted their final analyses, they again slightly agreed that there was a relationship; the 
magnitude of agreement was similar to what it had been initially, but again there was substantial 
variability (M = 0.61, SD = 1.20). Finally, after the group discussion, overall agreement 
increased slightly, and, notably, variability decreased (M = 0.75, SD = 0.70), which suggests 
some convergence in beliefs over time. The right-hand plot in Figure 4 shows the number of 
teams who endorsed each level of agreement at each of the four assessments. Beliefs converged 
over time, such that that toward the end of the project, more teams agreed that skin tone affected 
the number of red cards received. 
[TS: Please insert Figure 4 about here.] 
Fig. 4. 
  
The teams’ subjective beliefs about the primary research question across time. For each of the 
four subjective-beliefs surveys, the plot on the left shows each team leader’s response to the 
question asking whether players’ skin tone predicts how many red cards they receive. The heavy 
black line represents the mean response at each time point. Each individual trajectory is jittered 
slightly to increase the interpretability of the plot. The plot on the right shows the number of 
team leaders who endorsed each response option at each time point. 
The fourth and final survey assessed more nuanced beliefs about the primary research question. 
All the analysts were asked to respond individually to this survey. The new items included, for 
example, “The effect is positive and due to referee bias” and “There is little evidence for an 
effect.” The analysts responded to these items on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Summary statistics for this survey are reported in Table 5. By the end of the 
project, a majority of the analysts agreed that the data showed a positive relationship between the 
number of red cards received and players’ skin tone but were unclear regarding the underlying 
mechanism. The level of agreement was highest (78%) for the statement “The effect is positive 
and the mechanism is unknown” (M = 5.32, SD = 1.47). 
[TS: Please insert Table 5 about here.] 
What was the association between analysts’ subjective beliefs regarding the hypothesis and the 
results obtained? 
Of particular interest was whether subjective beliefs about the truth of the primary research 
hypothesis were related to the results the teams obtained. One might anticipate a confirmation 
bias, that is, that the analysts found what they initially expected to find. Alternatively, they might 
have rationally updated their beliefs in response to the empirical results they obtained, even if 
those results contradicted their initial expectations. 
  
The team leaders’ self-reports regarding the primary research question at each of the four 
assessments of beliefs were correlated with the final reported effect size, and the magnitude of 
this association increased across time: r = .14, 95% CI = [-.25, .49]; r = -.20, 95% CI = [-.53, 
.19]; r = .43, 95% CI = [.07, .69]; and r = .41, 95% CI = [.04, .68], respectively. Because both 
the magnitude of the estimated effect and the precision of the estimate varied by team, we also 
correlated the lower bound of the 95% CI and responses to this question and obtained the 
following correlations across the four time points: r = .29, 95% CI = [-.09, .60]; r = -.10, 95% 
CI = [-.46, .28]; r = .52, 95% CI = [.18, .75]; and r = .58, 95% CI = [.26, .78], respectively. 
In short, the analysts’ beliefs at registration regarding whether players with darker skin tone were 
more likely to receive red cards were not significantly related to the final effect sizes reported, 
but beliefs changed considerably throughout the research project, and as a result, the analysts’ 
post-analysis beliefs were significantly related to both the reported effect-size estimates and the 
lower bounds of the 95% CIs for these estimates. These results suggest that there was some 
updating of beliefs based on the empirical results. Although the sample size was small (N = 29), 
the overall results are more consistent with rational updating of beliefs based on the evidence 
than with confirmation bias. 
Does the analysts’ expertise explain the variability in results? 
An important question is whether the variability in the analytic choices made and results found 
by the teams resulted from teams with the greatest statistical expertise making different choices 
than the other teams. A related question is whether teams whose members had more quantitative 
expertise showed greater convergence in their estimated effect sizes. To answer these questions, 
we dichotomized the teams into two groups using latent class analysis. The first group (n = 9) 
was more likely to have a team member who had a Ph.D. (100% vs. 53%), was a professor at a 
  
university (100% vs. 37%), had taught a graduate statistics course more than twice (100% vs. 
0%), and had at least one methodological or statistical publication (78% vs. 47%). Seventy-eight 
percent of the teams in this first group reported effects that were statistically significant (median 
OR = 1.39, MAD = 0.13), whereas 68% of the teams with less expertise reported a significant 
effect (median OR = 1.30, MAD = 0.13). Analyses of the effects of the team’s quantitative 
expertise on their choice of statistical models is provided in Supplement 6. Note, however, that 
teams in both latent classes exhibited considerable variability in whether they found a significant 
effect, and the two classes had similar degrees of dispersion in their effect-size estimates. Thus, 
overall, statistical expertise may have had some influence on analytic approaches and estimated 
effect sizes, but does not explain the high variability in these choices or in the results obtained. 
Do the peer ratings of overall analysis quality explain the variability in results? 
We also examined whether the peer evaluations of the overall quality of each analytic approach 
were associated with the reported results. During the round-robin feedback phase, when the 
methods (but not results) for each team were known, the analysts rated their confidence in the 
suitability of other teams’ analytic plans. The final effect sizes reported by teams whose analytic 
approach received higher confidence ratings (no rating lower than 4; median OR = 1.31, MAD = 
0.15) did not differ from the reported effect sizes of those teams that received lower confidence 
ratings (median OR = 1.28, MAD = 0.12). Thus, there was little evidence that the variability in 
estimated effect sizes observed across teams was attributable to a subset of analyses that were 
lower than the others in quality overall. 
Do the peer assessments of specific statistical issues explain the variability in results? 
Toward the end of the crowdsourcing process, each team’s final analytic approach was evaluated 
by other analysts who had particular expertise in that approach. These experts assessed the extent 
  
to which the assigned approaches addressed each of seven statistical issues and also rated their 
overall confidence in the approaches. On average, each approach was assessed by 2.55 experts; 
16 were reviewed by 3 experts, and 13 were reviewed by 2 experts. The average rating of 
agreement that statistical issues had not been addressed was 2.18 (SD = 0.55) on a scale from 1 
to 5 (lower numbers indicate fewer unaddressed analytic issues). 
The experts tended to be more convinced by approaches in which fewer problematic issues 
remained, as indicated by a negative correlation between the average rating across the seven 
statistical issues and the experts’ rating of confidence (r = -.75, 95% CI = [-.60, -.86]). 
However, ratings for the analytic issues were unrelated to the OR for the relationship between 
darker skin tone and number of red cards received (r = .06, 95% CI = [-.35, .31]). Likewise, 
experts’ overall confidence in each analytic approach was unrelated to the OR for the 
relationship between skin tone and red cards (r = -.03, 95% CI = [-.39, .60]). Overall, analyses 
revealed relatively little evidence that analytic approaches with identifiable statistical problems 
accounted for the variability in results across teams (e.g. by producing abnormally large or small 
effect sizes). Supplement 14 reports exploratory analyses aimed at determining whether certain 
kinds of analyses exhibited more convergence across teams than others did. 
Implications for the Scientific Endeavor 
It is easy to understand that effects can vary across independent tests of the same research 
hypothesis when different sources of data are used. Variation in measures and samples, as well 
as random error in assessment, naturally produce variation in results. Here, we have 
demonstrated that as a result of researchers’ choices and assumptions during analysis, variation 
in estimated effect sizes can emerge even when analyses use the same data. The independent 
teams’ estimated effects for the primary research question ranged from 0.89 to 2.93 in OR units 
  
(1.0 indicates a null effect); no teams found a negative effect, 9 found no significant relationship, 
and 20 found a positive effect. If a single team, selected randomly from the present teams, had 
conducted the study using the same data set, there would have been a 69% probability of a 
positive estimated effect size and a 31% probability of a null effect. 
This variability in results cannot be readily accounted for by differences in expertise. Analysts 
with high and lower levels of quantitative expertise both exhibited high levels of variability in 
their estimated effect sizes. Further, analytic approaches that received highly favorable 
evaluations from peers showed the same variability in final effect sizes as did analytic 
approaches that were less favorably rated. This was true for two different measures of quality: 
peer ratings of overall quality and experts’ ratings of whether specific statistical issues had been 
addressed. 
The problem of analysis-contingent results is distinct from the problems introduced by p-
hacking, the garden of forking paths, and reanalyses of original data 
The main contribution of this article is in directly demonstrating the extent to which good-faith, 
yet subjective, analytic choices can have an impact on research results. This problem is related 
to, but distinct from, the problems associated with p-hacking (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 
2014), the garden of forking paths (Gelman & Loken, 2014), and reanalyses of original data used 
in published reports. 
p-hacking. 
As originally defined by Simonsohn et al. (2014), p-hacking is either consciously or 
unconsciously exploiting researcher degrees of freedom in order to achieve statistical 
significance. For instance, they wrote that “researchers may file merely the subsets of analyses 
that produce nonsignificant results. We refer to such behavior as p-hacking” (p. 534). Thus, p-
  
hacking is driven by the implicit or explicit goal to obtain statistically significant support for a 
particular conclusion. Although the specific decisions made in the process of p-hacking may be 
independently justifiable, it is not justifiable to choose an analytic strategy on the basis of 
whether it provides a desired result. Few editors would accept a manuscript, even one based on a 
series of prima facie defensible analytic choices, if the researchers admitted that they had made 
their analytic choices so as to reach the p < .05 criterion.  
In the current crowdsourcing project, all the teams knew that their analyses would be shown to 
other analysts and made public, and the perceived need to achieve a significant result for 
publishability was lessened by the nature of the project. Although distinct from p-hacking, highly 
defensible analytic decisions made without direct incentives to achieve statistical significance 
can still produce wide variability in effect-size estimates. In the case of the hypothesized 
relationship between players’ skin tone and referees’ red-card decisions, the findings collectively 
suggest a positive correlation, but this can be glimpsed only through the fog of varying 
subjective analytic decisions.  
The garden of forking paths. 
Gelman and Loken’s (2014) concept of a garden of forking paths focuses not on selection from 
among different analytic options in order to achieve significant results (as in p-hacking), but 
rather on testing for significance after patterns in the data have been observed. Such data-
contingent analyses do capitalize heavily (perhaps unintentionally) on chance, because patterns 
that emerge randomly are subjected to significance tests whose validity requires a priori 
predictions. This practice leads to “researcher degrees of freedom without fishing, [and] consists 
of computing a single test based on the data, but in an environment where a different test would 
have been performed given different data” (Gelman & Loken, 2014, p. 460).  
  
The analysis-contingent results we examined in the current project reveal an issue that is broader 
than the issue of forking paths: Variability in effect sizes can occur even when the researcher has 
not looked for patterns in the data first and tested for significance only after the fact. For 
example, the analysts were asked to test a specific relationship between players’ skin tone and 
referees’ red-card decisions. This arguably limited opportunities for a garden-of-forking-paths 
process, which might have taken the form of examining relationships between players’ various 
group-based characteristics (skin tone, ethnicity, per capita gross domestic product of country of 
origin), on the one hand, and various referee decisions (red cards, yellow cards, stoppage time, 
offside calls, disallowed goals), on the other, and then running formal significance tests only for 
the relationships that looked as if they might be meaningful. 
Moreover, imagine if the 29 teams had been required to preregister their analysis plans before 
observing the data (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Preregistration solves the problems of forking 
paths and p-hacking by removing the flexibility of data-contingent analyses and reducing the 
opportunity to present post hoc tests as a priori (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). However, 
preregistration would not have prevented the observed variability in effect-size estimates across 
the teams in this study. Outcomes can vary as a result of different, defensible analytic decisions 
whether they are made post hoc or a priori.  
Reanalyzing data used in published reports. 
Making data from published reports more accessible to facilitate reanalyses and postpublication 
peer review (Hunter, 2012; Simonsohn, 2013; Wicherts et al., 2006) is important for science, but 
also does not make fully transparent the contingency of observed findings on analytic decisions. 
For example, few scientists would bother to write (and even fewer editors would publish) a 
commentary presenting new analyses and results unless they suggest a conclusion different from 
  
the one in the original publication. This creates perverse incentives for both original authors and 
commenters. Original authors have strong incentives to find positive results so that their work 
will be published, and commenters have strong incentives to find different (usually negative) 
results for the same reason. Thus, published commentaries will almost inevitably differ from 
original articles in their analytic approaches and conclusions, which introduces a strong selection 
bias. 
In contrast, when data analysis is crowdsourced prior to publication, any individual analysis will 
not play a major role in the final publication decision, and the approach is collaborative rather 
than conflict oriented. The most obvious incentive may be to avoid making a public error 
analyzing an open data set. Thus, crowdsourcing data analysis may reduce dysfunctional 
incentives for both original authors and commenters, build connections between colleagues, and 
make transparent all approaches used and all results obtained. Crowdsourcing analysis can result 
in a much more accurate picture of the robustness of results and the dependency of the findings 
on subjective analytic choices.  
Conclusions. 
In sum, our crowd of analysts had no incentive to try different specifications and choose one that 
supported the hypothesis (p-hacking), to first examine the data and test for significant patterns 
only after the fact (the garden of forking paths), or to confirm or disconfirm a finding to achieve 
publication. Even so, the variability in analytic choices led to variability in observed results. This 
illustrates the breadth of the challenge posed by the fact that analytic choices can influence 
observed outcomes.  
How much variability in results is too much? 
  
Scientists can have comparatively more faith in a finding when there is less variability in analytic 
approaches taken to investigating the targeted phenomenon and in results obtained using 
different methods. In a follow-up to this project, Crowdsourcing Data Analysis 2, a group of 
more than 40 analysts have independently analyzed a complex data set to test hypotheses 
regarding the effects of gender and status on intellectual debates. This new crowd of analysts are 
reporting radically dispersed effect sizes, and in some cases significant effects in opposite 
directions for the same hypothesis tested with the same data. In such extreme cases of little to no 
convergence in results, the crowdsourcing process suggests that the scientific community should 
have no faith that the hypothesis is true, even if one or two teams find significant support with a 
defensible analysis—results that might have been publishable on their own. In the present project 
on referees’ decisions, the degree of convergence in results was relatively high by comparison, as 
more than two thirds of the teams found support for the hypothesis and the vast majority of 
teams obtained effect-size estimates in the predicted direction.  
There will almost always be variability in a measured effect depending on analytic choices. As 
transparency about this variability increases with data-posting requirements and additional 
crowdsourced projects, scientists and policymakers will need to make ultimately subjective 
decisions about how much consistency is enough (and not enough) to conclude an effect most 
likely exists. Similar subjective and continually debated decisions have had to be made about the 
cutoff for statistical significance (Benjamin et al., 2017; Johnson, 2013). Setting cutoffs may be 
particularly challenging for policymakers because it is their responsibility to make decisions, and 
the ideal information on which to base a decision would include both whether an effect exists 
and how large it is. For example, some economic interventions might have both societally 
positive and societally negative effects, and policymakers will want to have precise estimates of 
  
all these effects to evaluate the trade-offs. Policymakers and practitioners may require greater 
convergence in effect-size estimates than scientists, for whom establishing a directional effect is 
often sufficient for building theory. We believe that crowdsourcing data-analysis initiatives will 
help policymakers by improving estimation of confidence and uncertainty. Crowdsourced 
analysis, combined with preregistered investigations and replications, will provide more 
informed benchmarks regarding the contingency of observed findings on characteristics of the 
sample and setting, procedures followed, and analytic decisions.  
Generalizability to other data sets 
The results of the present crowdsourced initiative are striking because the research question, 
concerning the relationship between players’ skin tone and referees’ red-card decisions, was 
clear and, ostensibly, straightforward to investigate. Compared with many research questions in 
neuroscience, economics, biology, and psychology, this one is of relatively modest complexity. 
And yet the process of translating this question from natural language to statistical models gave 
rise to many different assumptions and choices that influenced the conclusions. This raises the 
possibility that hidden uncertainty due to the wide range of analytic choices available to 
researchers exists across a wide variety of research applications. 
Of course, more than one such investigation is needed to determine how contingent research 
results are on analytic decisions more generally. This demonstration is thus limited to being a 
case example; its conclusions are plausible, but have untested generalizability. For example, the 
project coordinators framed a specific research question for the analysts (Does players’ skin tone 
correlate with referees’ red-card decisions?), which may have artificially reduced the variability 
in estimated effect sizes. The research question could have been posed more broadly (Is there 
evidence of bias against minority groups in referees’ decisions?), or the key outcome measure 
  
(e.g., number of yellow cards, number of red cards, stoppage time) could have been left up to 
each research team. This research question is being examined in Crowdsourcing Data Analysis 2, 
on the roles of gender and status in intellectual debates. In this follow-up project, analysts are 
also choosing how to operationalize each construct (e.g., is academic status best measured by 
citation counts, job rank, school rank, or some combination of these?). As noted earlier, the 
variability in effect-size estimates is even greater in this second project than in the present 
initiative. Systematic investigation via crowdsourcing will facilitate more general conclusions 
about how contingent research results are on analytic choices, and what characteristics of the 
research question, data set, and analyses serve as moderating variables. 
There are also constraints on the useful application of crowdsourcing strategies. For example, the 
flexibility in analytic choices and thus their impact on estimated effect sizes is likely to be 
greatest when data sets are complex (e.g., longitudinal data sets with missing data, many 
potential covariates, levels of nesting). It remains an empirical question how contingent results 
are on analytic choices in the case of comparatively simple experimental studies with two to four 
conditions and few measured variables. There may still be enough choice points (outlier 
exclusions and statistical transformations, such as in the case of skewed data), even when 
researchers analyze a relatively simple data set, to introduce considerable variability in results 
based on those choices (Steegen, Tuerlinckx, Gelman, & Vanpaemel, 2016).  
Notably, the robustness of experimental laboratory effects can also be assessed via replications 
repeating the same experimental design with new research participants (Ebersole et al., 2016; 
Klein et al., 2014). Crowdsourcing data analysis is particularly relevant for data sets that have 
many analytic choice points and that cannot easily be independently replicated with new 
observations. Crowdsourcing may also add a great deal of value when controversial research 
  
questions are being addressed or when there are many competing theoretical predictions to be 
adjudicated empirically. 
Recommendations for individual researchers and teams 
Because of practical constraints, most future scientific investigations will not involve crowds of 
researchers. For a lone analyst working without the benefit of a crowd, we recommend use of a 
specification curve (Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2016) or multiverse analysis (Steegen et 
al., 2016). With these approaches, the analyst in effect tries to come up with every different 
defensible analysis he or she can, runs them all, and then computes the likelihood that the 
number of observed significant results would be seen if there really is no effect (Simonsohn et 
al., 2016). 
Crowdsourcing the analysis of data has greatly reduced efficiency compared with attempting 
many specifications as an individual. However, when feasible, a crowdsourced approach adds 
value in a number of ways. A globally distributed crowdsourced project will leverage skills, 
perspectives, and approaches to data analysis that no single analyst or research team can 
realistically muster alone. In addition, a crowd of analysts has no perverse incentive to conduct a 
primary analysis or robustness check that produces statistically significant support for the 
research hypothesis. In contrast, a traditional research team seeking to publish in a top academic 
journal has a strong perverse incentive to select both a primary analysis and robustness checks 
that return publishable results, something that is relatively easy to do given the numerous 
possible specifications typically available to choose from. Further, crowdsourcing data analysis 
allows for different research teams to discuss and debate analytic concerns with a richness and 
depth not typically seen in the academic review process, in which reviewers and editors rarely 
  
have access to the data themselves, and often choose to focus on aspects of a manuscript other 
than the analytic approach chosen. 
Conclusion 
The observed results from analyzing a complex data set can be highly contingent on justifiable, 
but subjective, analytic decisions. Uncertainty in interpreting research results is therefore not just 
a function of statistical power or the use of questionable research practices; it is also a function 
of the many reasonable decisions that researchers must make in order to conduct the research. 
This does not mean that analyzing data and drawing research conclusions is a subjective 
enterprise with no connection to reality. It does mean that many subjective decisions are part of 
the research process and can affect the outcomes. The best defense against subjectivity in science 
is to expose it. Transparency in data, methods, and process gives the rest of the community 
opportunity to see the decisions, question them, offer alternatives, and test these alternatives in 
further research. 
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Materials Available Online 
Project stage and resource URL 
Stage 1  
 Project page https://osf.io/gvm2z/ 
 Codebook https://osf.io/9yh4x/ 
Stage 3  
 Survey for teams to report 
their analytic approach 
https://osf.io/yug9r/ 
 Summary of each team’s 
analytic approach 
https://osf.io/3ifm2/ 
Stage 4  
 Survey evaluating teams’ 
analytic strategies 
https://osf.io/evfts/ 
 Round-robin feedback from 
the survey (in Qualtrics survey-
software format) 
https://osf.io/ic634/ 
Stage 5  
 Report of all analyses https://osf.io/qix4g 
Stage 6a  
  
 E-mail discussion of the 
analytic approaches 
https://osf.io/8eg94/ 
 Discussion on the 
appropriateness of the covariates 
https://osf.io/2prib/ 
Stage 7  
 Instructions for the peer 
evaluation 
https://osf.io/8e7du/ 
Supplemental Material 
Additional supporting information can be found at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/2515245917747646 
Open Practices 
All data and materials have been made publicly available via the Open Science Framework and 
can be accessed at https://osf.io/47tnc/ and https://osf.io/gvm2z/. The complete Open Practices 
Disclosure for this article can be found at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/2515245917747646. This article has received 
badges for Open Data and Open Materials. More information about the Open Practices badges 
can be found at http://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/badges.  
Notes 
1. This project also included a second research question: whether country-level preferences for 
light versus dark skin predict the red-card decisions of referees from the countries for which we 
had data on such preferences. In brief, the teams found little to no evidence that referees’ 
decisions were moderated by explicit or implicit skin-tone preferences. However, data on 
individual referees’ skin-tone preferences were not available; this variable was a measure of 
  
preferences based on aggregated data from referees’ nations of origin, and the majority of the 
analysts judged the available data set to be inadequate to test this potential moderator. Detailed 
results are reported in Supplement 7 in the Supplemental Material available online. 
2. One of the coauthors of this article, D. Molden, strongly disagreed with the project 
coordinators’ decision to allow teams to choose to retain these covariates in any final analyses. 
He argued that the high rate of movement of players between clubs and leagues each year (~150–
200 players per league per year) invalidated the use of static club and league values from a single 
year in any data set that spanned multiple years, as the present one did. He further argued that 
these conditions rendered the decision to use these variables a major analytic mistake, not a 
defensible analytic choice. 
3. Because the majority of teams used analyses that favored reporting odds ratios, we chose this 
effect size as the common effect size. For teams that performed standard linear regression 
analyses, we used traditional conversion formulas (from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2009) for both Cohen’s d and standardized regression weights (assumed to be 
correlation coefficients). Additionally, because the prevalence of red cards is so low, we made 
the “rare disease” assumption by assuming that the risk ratios yielded in analyses adopting a 
Poisson regression framework were fair approximations to odds ratios (Viera, 2008). 
References 
Babtie, A. C., Kirk, P., & Stumpf, M. P. H. (2014). Topological sensitivity analysis for systems 
biology. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 111, 18507–18512. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1414026112 
Bakker, M., van Dijk, A., & Wicherts, J. M. (2012). The rules of the game called psychological 
science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 543–554. doi:10.1177/1745691612459060 
  
Benjamin, D., Berger, J., Johannesson, M., Nosek, B., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Berk, R., . . . 
Johnson, V. (2017). Redefine statistical significance. Retrieved from https://psyarxiv.com/mky9j 
Bodenhausen, G. V. (1988). Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: Testing 
process models of stereotype use. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 726–737. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.5.726 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H. R. (2009). Converting among 
effect sizes. In Introduction to meta-analysis (pp. 45–50). Chichester, England: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Carp, J. (2012a). On the plurality of (methodological) worlds: Estimating the analytic flexibility 
of fMRI experiments. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6, Article 149. doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00149 
Carp, J. (2012b). The secret lives of experiments: Methods reporting in the fMRI literature. 
NeuroImage, 63, 289–300. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.07.004 
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officer’s dilemma: Using 
ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83, 1314–1329. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1314 
Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: Why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7–29. 
Ebersole, C. R., Atherton, O. E., Belanger, A. L., Skulborstad, H. M., Allen, J. M., Banks, J. B., . 
. . Nosek, B. A. (2016). Many Labs 3: Evaluating participant pool quality across the academic 
semester via replication. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 67, 68–82. 
Ebrahim, S., Sohani, Z. N., Montoya, L., Agarwal, A., Thorlund, K., Mills, E. J., & Ioannidis, J. 
P. A. (2014). Reanalyses of randomized clinical trial data. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 312, 1024–1032. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.9646 
  
Frank, M. G., & Gilovich, T. (1988). The dark side of self- and social perception: Black 
uniforms and aggression in professional sports. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
54, 74–85. 
Gelman, A., & Loken, E. (2014). The statistical crisis in science. American Scientist, 102, 460–
465. 
Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2003). Facing prejudice: Implicit prejudice and the 
perception of facial threat. Psychological Science, 14, 640–643. doi:10.1046/j.0956-
7976.2003.psci_1478.x 
Hunter, J. (2012). Post-publication peer review: Opening up scientific conversation. Frontiers in 
Computational Neuroscience, 6, Article 63. doi:10.3389/fncom.2012.00063 
Johnson, V. E. (2013). Revised standards for statistical evidence. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, USA, 110, 19313–19317. 
Kim, J. W., & King, B. G. (2014). Seeing stars: Matthew effects and status bias in Major League 
Baseball umpiring. Management Science, 60, 2619–2644. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.1967 
Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K. A., Vianello, M., Adams, R. B., Jr., Bahník, Š., Bernstein, M. J., . . . 
Nosek, B. A. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “Many Labs” replication project. 
Social Psychology, 45, 142–152. 
Krumholz, H. M., & Peterson, E. D. (2014). Open access to clinical trials data. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 312, 1002–1003. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.9647 
Maddox, K. B., & Chase, S. G. (2004). Manipulating subcategory salience: Exploring the link 
between skin tone and social perception of Blacks. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 
533–546. doi:10.1002/ejsp.214 
  
Maddox, K. B., & Gray, S. A. (2002). Cognitive representations of Black Americans: 
Reexploring the role of skin tone. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 250–259. 
doi:10.1177/0146167202282010 
McCullough, B. D., McGeary, K. A., & Harrison, T. D. (2006). Do economics journal archives 
promote replicable research? Canadian Journal of Economics, 41, 1406–1420. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00509.x 
Parsons, C. A., Sulaeman, J., Yates, M. C., & Hamermesh, D. S. (2011). Strike three: 
Discrimination, incentives, and evaluation. American Economic Review, 101, 1410–1435.  
Price, J., & Wolfers, J. (2010). Racial discrimination among NBA referees. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 125, 1859–1887. 
Sakaluk, J. K., Williams, A. J., & Biernat, M. (2014). Analytic review as a solution to the 
misreporting of statistical results in psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 9, 652–660. doi:10.1177/1745691614549257 
Sidanius, J., Pena, Y., & Sawyer, M. (2001). Inclusionary discrimination: Pigmentocracy and 
patriotism in the Dominican Republic. Political Psychology, 22, 827–851. doi:10.1111/0162-
895X.00264 
Simonsohn, U. (2013). Just post it: The lesson from two cases of fabricated data detected by 
statistics alone. Psychological Science, 24, 1875–1888. 
Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). P-curve: A key to the file-drawer. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 534–547. 
Simonsohn, U., Simmons, J., & Nelson, L. (2016). Specification curve: Descriptive and 
inferential statistics for all plausible specifications. Unpublished manuscript, Operations, 
Information and Decisions Department, University of Pennsylvania. 
  
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed 
flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychological 
Science, 22, 1359–1366. doi:10.1177/0956797611417632 
Steegen, S., Tuerlinckx, F., Gelman, A., & Vanpaemel, W. (2016). Increasing transparency 
through a multiverse analysis. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 702 –712. 
Twine, F. W. (1998). Racism in a racial democracy: The maintenance of White supremacy in 
Brazil. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Viera, A. J. (2008). Odds ratios and risk ratios: What’s the difference and why does it matter? 
Southern Medical Journal, 101, 730–734. doi:10.1097/SMJ.0b013e31817a7ee4 
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Wetzels, R., Borsboom, D., van der Maas, H. L. J., & Kievit, R. A. (2012). 
An agenda for purely confirmatory research. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 632–638. 
doi:10.1177/1745691612463078 
Wicherts, J. M., Borsboom, D., Kats, J., & Molenaar, D. (2006). The poor availability of 
psychological research data for reanalysis. American Psychologist, 61, 726–728. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.726 
Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics for Some of the Player Variables 
Variable Statistic 
Height (cm) M = 181.74 (SD = 6.69) 
Weight (kg) M = 75.64 (SD = 7.10) 
Number of games M = 71.13 (SD = 36.17) 
Number of yellow cards M = 27.41 (SD = 24.08) 
  
Number of red cards M = 0.89 (SD = 1.26) 
League country   
 England  n = 564 players 
 France n = 533 players 
 Germany n = 489 players 
 Spain n = 467 players 
Skin color  
 0 (very light skin) Rater 1: n = 626 players 
Rater 2: n = 451 players 
 .25 Rater 1: n = 551 players 
Rater 2: n = 693 players 
 .50 Rater 1: n = 170 players 
Rater 2: n = 174 players 
 .75 Rater 1: n = 140 players 
Rater 2: n = 141 players 
 1 (very dark skin) Rater 1: n = 98 players 
Rater 2: n = 126 players 
 Not available Rater 1: n = 468 players 
Rater 2: n = 468 players 
Player position   
 Attacking midfielder  n = 149 players 
 Center back  n = 281 players 
  
 Center forward  n = 227 players 
 Center midfielder  n = 84 players 
 Defensive midfielder  n = 204 players 
 Goalkeeper  n = 196 players 
 Left fullback n = 136 players 
 Left midfielder n = 86 players 
 Left winger n = 59 players 
 Not available n = 367 players 
 Right fullback n = 126 players 
 Right midfielder n = 75 players 
 Right winger n = 63 players 
Table 3. 
Analytic Approaches and Results for Each Team 
Team Distribution Treatment of 
nonindependence 
Number of 
covariates 
Analytic approach OR 
1 Linear Clustered standard 
errors 
7 Ordinary least squares with robust 
standard errors, logistic regression 
1.18 [0.95, 1.41] 
6 Linear Clustered standard 
errors 
6 Linear probability model 1.28 [0.77, 2.13] 
14 Linear Clustered standard 
errors 
6 Weighted least squares regression 
with clustered standard errors 
1.21 [0.97, 1.46] 
4 Linear None 3 Spearman correlation 1.21 [1.20, 1.21] 
  
11 Linear None 4 Multiple linear regression 1.25 [1.05, 1.49] 
10 Linear Variance 
component 
3 Multilevel regression and logistic 
regression 
1.03 [1.01, 1.05] 
2 Logistic Clustered standard 
errors 
6 Linear probability model, logistic 
regression 
1.34 [1.10, 1.63] 
30 Logistic Clustered standard 
errors 
3 Clustered robust binomial logistic 
regression 
1.28 [1.04, 1.57] 
31 Logistic Clustered standard 
errors 
6 Logistic regression 1.12 [0.88, 1.43] 
32 Logistic Clustered standard 
errors 
1 Generalized linear models for binary 
data 
1.39 [1.10, 1.75] 
8 Logistic None 0 Negative binomial regression with a 
log link 
1.39 [1.17, 1.65] 
15 Logistic None 1 Hierarchical log-linear modeling 1.02 [1.00, 1.03] 
3 Logistic Variance 
component 
2 Multilevel logistic regression using 
Bayesian inference 
1.31 [1.09, 1.57] 
5 Logistic Variance 
component 
0 Generalized linear mixed models 1.38 [1.10, 1.75] 
9 Logistic Variance 
component 
2 Generalized linear mixed-effects 
models with a logit link  
1.48 [1.20, 1.84] 
17 Logistic Variance 
component 
2 Bayesian logistic regression 0.96 [0.77, 1.18] 
  
18 Logistic Variance 
component 
2 Hierarchical Bayes model 1.10 [0.98, 1.27] 
23 Logistic Variance 
component 
2 Mixed-model logistic regression 1.31 [1.10, 1.56] 
24 Logistic Variance 
component 
3 Multilevel logistic regression 1.38 [1.11, 1.72] 
25 Logistic Variance 
component 
4 Multilevel logistic binomial 
regression 
1.42 [1.19, 1.71] 
28 Logistic Variance 
component 
2 Mixed-effects logistic regression 1.38 [1.12, 1.71] 
21 Miscellaneous Clustered standard 
errors 
3 Tobit regression 2.88 [1.03, 11.47] 
7 Miscellaneous None 0 Dirichlet-process Bayesian 
clustering 
1.71 [1.70, 1.72] 
12 Poisson Fixed effect 2 Zero-inflated Poisson regression 0.89 [0.49, 1.60] 
27 Poisson None 1 Poisson regression 2.93 [0.11, 78.66] 
13 Poisson Variance 
component 
1 Poisson multilevel modeling 1.41 [1.13, 1.75] 
16 Poisson Variance 
component 
2 Hierarchical Poisson regression 1.32 [1.06, 1.63] 
20 Poisson Variance 
component 
1 Cross-classified multilevel negative 
binomial model  
1.40 [1.15, 1.71] 
  
26 Poisson Variance 
component 
6 Hierarchical generalized linear 
modeling with Poisson sampling 
1.30 [1.08, 1.56] 
Note: Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Each team’s observed effect size is 
presented in this table as an odds ratio, but some of the teams reported effect sizes in other units 
that were converted to odds ratios. Those originally reported effect sizes are as follows—Team 
4: Cohen’s d = 0.10, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.10]; Team 11: Cohen’s d = 0.12, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.22]; 
Team 10: b = 0.01, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.01]; Team 21: b = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.56]; Team 12: 
incidental risk ratio (IRR) = 0.89, 95% CI = [0.49, 1.60]; Team 27: IRR = 2.93, 95% CI = [0.11, 
78.66]; Team 13: IRR = 1.41, 95% CI = [1.13, 1.75]; Team 16: IRR = 1.32, 95% CI = [1.06, 
1.63]; Team 20: IRR = 1.40, 95% CI = [1.15, 1.71]; Team 26: IRR = 1.30, 95% CI = [1.08, 
1.56]. 
Table 4. 
Covariates Included by Each Team  
Covariate Team % of 
teams 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 
Player 
position 
X X X   X   X X X X X X     X X X X X X  X X X X 69% 
Player’s 
height 
X X  X  X        X      X  X X X   X X  38% 
Player’s 
weight 
X X  X  X      X  X        X X X   X X  38% 
Player’s X          X    X      X   X  X  X  24% 
  
league 
countrya 
Player’s 
age 
X     X     X   X  X    X    X      24% 
Goals 
scored by 
player 
 X         X     X       X  X   X  21% 
Player’s 
club 
X     X        X              X  14% 
Referee’s 
country 
 X X X     X                     14% 
Referee X     X        X                10% 
Player’s 
number of 
victories 
 X        X              X      10% 
Number of 
cards 
received 
by player 
                X X            7% 
Player                  X            3% 
Number of 
cards 
                X             3% 
  
awarded 
by referee 
Number of 
draws 
         X                    3% 
Number of 
covariates 
7 6 2 3 0 6 0 0 2 3 4 2 1 6 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 6 1   
Note: The covariates are listed in order of the frequency with which they were included in teams’ 
analytic approaches. The number of games a player had played was essential to the analysis, was 
used by all teams, and is thus not listed here as a separate covariate.  
aTeam 9 mistakenly labeled referee’s country as league country. 
Table 5. 
Analysts’ Mean Agreement With Potential Conclusions That Could Be Drawn From the Data 
Conclusion Mean SD 
Positive relationship likely caused by referee bias 3.37 1.65 
Positive relationship likely caused by unobserved variables (e.g., players’ behavior) 4.21 1.37 
Positive relationship but the cause is unknown 5.32 1.47 
Positive relationship, but it is contingent on a relatively small number of outlier 
observations 
3.18 1.31 
Positive relationship, but it is contingent on other variables in the data set (e.g., 
differences across leagues) 
3.84 1.33 
Little evidence of a relationship 3.17 1.66 
No relationship 2.49 1.28 
  
Negative relationship 1.64 0.80 
Note: The results shown are from the final survey. Each item concerned whether there is a 
relationship between players’ skin tone and the number of red-card decisions they receive. The 
response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items have been 
paraphrased for inclusion in the table. 
